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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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DDI -
2 May

2 May 1983

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Inouye:

Because your support for the analytical side of intelligence has been so important over the years, I am deeply concerned over your reservations with respect to our request for additional analyst positions for FY 84. I hope that in the not too distant future I will have the opportunity to meet with you and discuss our work and future plans. In the meantime, to the extent it may be helpful in explaining the scope of our resource problems and the purpose for which the additional analysts are intended, I would like to provide you with additional information relevant to our FY 84 personnel request.

As you will recall, during the 1960s and 1970s the strength of the Intelligence Community dropped [redacted] 25X1
Beginning in 1979-80 the SSCI -- with your leadership -- began helping to rebuild the Community. During the first several years the emphasis was on improving our collection capabilities across the board -- the GDIP, the CCP and CIA. For example from FY-1980 through FY-1983, CIA received [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] of these, the Directorate of Intelligence received [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] analysts, with the remainder secretaries, file clerks, and information processors. Should the Agency's FY-1984 requests be satisfied, the Directorate of Intelligence will have received [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] for the Agency as a whole (FY-80 through FY-84). Beginning in FY 84, however, CIA is giving emphasis to rebuilding its analytic capability.

These increments to our analytic strength come against a background of virtually no increase in the number of analyst positions in CIA between 1963 and 1981. I hardly need to remind you of the enormous multiplication of Soviet weapons and R&D programs during this period as well as the increasingly sophisticated nature of weapons analysis [redacted] 25X1
[redacted]

Moreover, during that period many new analytic tasks were assigned to CIA by the President and the National Security Council. These included the whole

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issue of technology transfer (for which we had to reassign [] analysts working on other problems), terrorism (to which we assigned [] analysts), narcotics (where we have [] analysts), international energy and economic affairs growing out of the 1973 embargo and the revolution in Iran, and so forth.


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Much of the resource request for this directorate during this period of rebuilding is to reconstruct our Soviet effort and again to put in place a strong analytic capability on Third World to allow us to forecast in a timely way for the policymaker problems in the developing nations and the newly industrializing countries that will affect the United States. The reorganization of the directorate by John McMahon in late 1981 demonstrated vividly the scarcity of our resources on a large number of important subjects, including most especially the Third World, Eastern Europe, technological developments abroad and the Soviet economy.

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
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You and the Committee strongly supported our request for analyst positions last year, and I hope you will continue to support our effort to rebuild capabilities we have lost and our capability to meet new problems.


Sincerely,



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Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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